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We measure the performance of public spending in Italian regions regarding the 
provision of public services, by constructing a so-called total regional performance 
indicator for strategic sectors such as general administration, energy, water and 
sewage, solid waste, and transports for 2001. This composite indicator is then the 
output measure selected to assess expenditure efficiency for the Italian regions, using 
the non-parametric DEA approach. The computation of efficiency scores allows to 
rank the regions and to detect some room for improvement in terms of efficiency 
gains at the regional level. 
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1 – Introduction 
 
Some available studies assess the performance and efficiency of public sector 
spending, namely in terms of international comparisons. For instance, Fakin and 
Crombrugghe (1997) and Afonso, Schuknecht and Tanzi (2003) assess public 
expenditure in the OECD, Clements (2002) analysis education spending in Europe, 
Gupta and Verhoeven (2001) addresses education and health in Africa, while St. 
Aubyn (2003) and Afonso and St. Aubyn (2004) study health and education 
expenditure efficiency in the OECD. Nevertheless, the literature on the efficiency of 
local government is rather scarce. De Borger and Kerstens (1996) apply non-
parametric analysis to public spending efficiency in Belgian municipalities, while 
Afonso e Fernandes (2003) also use a non-parametric approach for municipalities in 
the region of Lisbon, and Balassone, Francese and Giordano (2002) review non-
parametric applications to some public services in Italy. 
 
The purpose of this paper is to assess the efficiency of publicly provided private 
services at the regional level in Italy. We measure the performance of Italian regions 
regarding the provision of public services by constructing a so-called total regional 
performance indicator for strategic sectors such as general administration, energy, 
water and sewage, solid waste, transports. Using such composite indicator as an 
output measure, we then use a non-parametric methodology, Data Envelopment 
Analysis (DEA), to estimate efficiency scores for public spending in the 20 Italian 
Regions in 2001. By means of frontier analysis we are able to identify regions that 
might qualify as “performing well” from those were some improvement might 
increase their efficiency. To our knowledge, this is a first effort of checking efficiency 
and productivity in Italian Regions using non-parametric analysis. Moreover, the 
relationship between citizens and policy makers as far as the demand for efficient 
public services is concerned will also be discussed.  
 
The paper is organised as follows. In section two we give some motivation and 
provide stylised facts regarding the Italian Regions. Section three briefly presents the 
analytical framework. In section four we compute a regional performance indicator, 
which is then used as the output measures in the DEA analysis whose results are then 
reported and discussed. Section five provides conclusions. 
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2 – Motivation and stylised facts 
 
Italy has devoted the last decade to “reform” the public governance, shifting from a 
highly interventionist state towards a modern regulatory one, introducing transparent 
rules, market openness, and competition. According to the Regulator’s aim, the 
reform should have been able to enforce the competition, but the reality was very 
complex, showing the presence of significant diversity among the Italian regions. In 
some cases, there was a bias either in granting long concessions or to maintain the 
direct control on the service delivery. Nevertheless, in other cases, there was openness 
towards a more competitive market, introducing the tender system. Consequently, as 
more powers have been delivered to regional and local governments, the task of 
monitoring and correcting competition problems in regulation has become more 
complex, highlighting the absence of a well-established culture of competition in local 
governments. 
 
The Italian utilities and network industries have changed significantly during the last 
ten years. This process was due namely to the response that Italy gave to European 
obligations to liberalise the public utilities sectors, in line to what happended across 
the euro area. Consequently, Italy’s governance and markets were reformed and new 
relations established between the State, citizens, and the market. In order to assess the 
performance and responsibilities of the Italian regions in providing public services, a 
brief overview of the local government institutional features and responsibilities is 
provided below.  
 
Still far of being a federal state, Italy is nowadays a regional state, whose local 










Figure 1 – The organization of the local government in Italy 
 
Note: Ordinary regions (Abruzzo, Basilicata, Calabria, Campania, Emilia – Romagna, 
Lazio, Liguria, Lombardia, Marche, Molise, Piemonte, Puglia, Toscana, Umbria, 
Veneto); regions with relative political autonomy (Valle d’Aosta, Trentino Alto Adige, 
Sicilia, Sardegna and Friuli Venezia Giulia). 
 
The first level includes the 20 Italian regions, which are divided in Ordinary Regions 
(regioni a statuto ordinario) and regions with political autonomy in certain matters 
(regioni a statuto speciale). While the latter (Valle d’Aosta, Trentino Alto Adige, 
Sicilia, Sardegna and Friuli Venezia Giulia) were formally established between 1943 
and 1963, the former were only created in 1970. The choice of the distinction was due 
mainly to the pressing demand of authonomy according to the peculiar etnical culture 
of those regions. Despite this regional organisation being in place for more than 
twenty years, the country was characterised by a highly centralised model, where the 
others local entities at the second level, Provinces and Municipalities had only a 
residual power.  
 
Since 1997, after the introduction of the so-called “Bassanini reforms”, a significant 
programme for public sector revitalisation helped the country in improving its use of 
best practice tools for regulatory quality. Legislation identifying the specific tasks of 
the regions and of the other local entities was introduced in order to guarantee the so-
called territorial empowerment, reinforcing the effectiveness of the local policies.1 
Moreover, the Constitutional Reform that occurred in 2000, has modified 
                                                          
1 Laws n. 59/1997 and n. 127/97 modified by Laws n. 191/98 and n. 50/99. 
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substantially the regions’ competences giving them new powers.2 In particular, two 
main innovations should be mentioned: 
 
i) The range of competencies on which regions can legislate was fully 
modified, i.e. the law mentions that the regions have the legislative power 
on all the topics not expressly reserved to the national government;3 
ii) A series of exclusive competences are attributed to the regions, on 
which the national government has no longer power.  
 
As shown in Table 1, regions have de facto implemented their local power, both on 
the provision of public goods and on the definition of the local regulatory system.4 
 
Table 1 – Main areas on which the Italian regions have both legislative and 
administrative competence 
 




- Health care system 
- School sid 
- Cultural supply 
- Professional training 
- Social sid 
- Welfare assistance 
- Urban and territorial 
planning 
- Water and sewage system 
- Defence of the territory 
- Protection of the 
environment 
- Transport planning with 
the possibility to give 
transfer funds in order to 







Source: Scaglioni (2004). 
 
During the last decade a variety of incentives, such as service contracts (Contratti di 
servizio) and citizens charts (Carte dei Servizi) for public services were introduced in 
order to improve the quality of the public services (transports, sanity, energy, 
communications), and to provide commitments to performance criteria and 
compensation for customer non-satisfaction. Moreover, an effort was made to 
liberalise local public utilities, with the attempt to introduce market principles in water 
                                                          
2 Constitutional Law n. 3/2001. 
3 This broadens the number of competences that can be regulated by the regional autorities. For an 
historical excursus, see Giarda (2004). 
4 In the Appendix, more detailde information is provided concerning the main interventions that 
occurred in some public utilities sectors. 
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distribution, energy (other than electricity), public transport, and waste management, 
and a series of laws were approved to change the regulatory framework.5 
 
Alongside with the aforementioned institutional reforms, it was possible to notice the 
increase of both investment and employment levels in local public services. For 
instance, investment in total public services increased significantly in Italy between 
1998 and 2002, around 33.9 per cent, while investment in local public services 
increased even more, by 43.3 per cent (see Figure 2). Additionally, and considering 
the variation of employment, Figure 3 shows that employment in local public services 
broadly stabilised in the same period, vis-à-vis a decrease of some 10 per cent in total 
public services.  
 

































                                                          
5 In the Appendix we provide an illustration of the key regulatory interventions occurred in the 
sectors we are considering. 
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National Public Services Local Public Services
Total Public Services
 
Source: adapted from Confservizi (2004) 
 
The objective of the reforms was to promote competition, even if its effectiveness 
depended mainly on the support given by the local governments. In practice, the 
results were mixed across the Italian regions. In some cases, there was a strong will to 
maintain the direct control of the service delivery, while there was also openness 
towards a more competitive market, introducing the tender system.6  
 
As more powers have been devolved to regional and local governments, the task of 
monitoring and correcting regulatory competition problems has become more 
complex. This stems partly from the fact that the culture of competition is still not 
well established in local governments. Many concession-granting powers remain 
under local and regional governments’ control including licensing, land use, and 
planning and development. One of the possible disadvantages of the reform was a 
potential for confusion between supervision and management, together with a long 
transition process, which may have weakened the force of competition or reinforced 





                                                          
6 As in the case of the local public transports in Rome and in Valle d’Aosta. For a review on local 
public transports, see Boitani and Cambini (2001). 
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3 – Analytical framework 
 
Data Envelopment Analysis, originating from Farrell (1957) seminal work and 
popularised by Charnes, Cooper and Rhodes (1978), assumes the existence of a 
convex production frontier, a hypothesis that is not required for instance in the Fred 
Disposable Hull approach. The production frontier in the DEA approach is 
constructed using linear programming methods. The terminology “envelopment” 
stems out from the fact that the production frontier envelops the set of observations.7 
 
DEA allows the calculation of technical efficiency measures that can be either input 
or output oriented. The purpose of an input-oriented study is to evaluate by how much 
input quantity can be proportionally reduced without changing the output quantities. 
Alternatively, and by computing output-oriented measures, one could also try to 
assess how much output quantities can be proportionally increased without changing 
the input quantities used. The two measures provide the same results under constant 
returns to scale but give different values under variable returns to scale. Nevertheless, 
and since the computation uses linear programming, not subject to statistical problems 
such as simultaneous equation bias and specification errors, both output and input-
oriented models will identify the same set of efficient/inefficient producers or 
Decision Making Units (DMUs).8 
 
The analytical description of the linear programming problem to be solved, in the 
variable returns to scale hypothesis, is sketched below. Suppose there are k inputs and 
m outputs for n DMUs. For the i-th DMU, yi is the column vector of the outputs and xi 
is the column vector of the inputs. We can also define X as the (k×n) input matrix and 
Y as the (m×n) output matrix. The DEA model is then specified with the following 
mathematical programming problem, for a given i-th DMU: 9 
 
                                                          
7 Coelli et al. (2002), and Thanassoulis (2001) offer good introductions to the DEA methodology. 
8 In fact, the choice between input and output orientations is not crucial since only the two 
measures associated with the inefficient units may be different between the two methodologies. 
9 We simply present here the equivalent envelopment form, derived by Charnes et al. (1978), 
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In problem (1), θ is a scalar (that satisfies θ≤ 1), more specifically it is the efficiency 
score that measures technical efficiency of unit (xi, yi). It measures the distance 
between a decision unit and the efficiency frontier, defined as a linear combination of 
best practice observations. With θ<1, the decision unit is inside the frontier (i.e. it is 
inefficient), while θ=1 implies that the decision unit is on the frontier (i.e. it is 
efficient). 
 
The vector λ is a (n×1) vector of constants, which measures the weights used to 
compute the location of an inefficient DMU if it were to become efficient. The 
inefficient DMU would be projected on the production frontier as a linear 
combination, using those weights, of the peers of the inefficient DMU. The peers are 
other DMUs that are more efficient and therefore are used as references for the 
inefficient DMU.  
 
1n  is a n-dimensional vector of ones. The restriction 1'1 =λn  imposes convexity of 
the frontier, accounting for variable returns to scale. Dropping this restriction would 
amount to admit that returns to scale were constant. Additionally, notice that problem 
(1) has to be solved for each of the n DMUs in order to obtain the n efficiency scores. 
 
In a simple example, three different hypothetical regions display the following values 
for indicator y and expense level x, as reported in Table 2: 
 
Table 2 – Values for regions A, B and C 
 
 Indicator Expenditure 
Region A 65 800 
Region B 68 1150 
Region C 75 1000 
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Expenditure is lower in region A, and the output level is also the lowest. Region C 
does not exhibit the highest expenditure, and attains the best level of output. Region B 
may be considered inefficient, in the sense that it performs worse than region C. The 
latter achieves a better status with less expense. 
 
Figure 4 illustrates DEA frontiers with the data of Table 2. The variable returns to 
scale frontier unites the origin (not depicted) to point A, and then point A to point C. 
 
Figure 4 – DEA frontiers 
 
 
4 – Non-parametric efficiency analysis of regional spending in Italy 
 
In our analysis we assess the efficiency for strategic sectors such as general 
administration, energy, water and sewage, solid waste, transports of the 20 Italian 
Regions in 2001. As inputs we use both public sector employees and public 
expenditure. Particularly, we use the database on Regional Public Accounts (MEF-
DPS, Banca Dati Conti Pubblici Territoriali) collected by the Italian Ministry for 
Economics and Finance. Regarding the output measure we first construct a composite 
indicator that tries to take into account the several areas of public provision of 
services and goods. 
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4.1 – Total regional performance indicator (TRPI) 
 
In this subsection we construct our measure of performance for Italian regions in 
providing public services to the population, by computing the so-called total regional 
performance indicator (TRPI) for 2001. This composite indicator is a simple average 
of seven sub-indicators of regional public performance: water provision, waste 
collection, frequency of the accidental long interruptions of the electrical  service, 
public transportation utilization, railway utilization, motorway network, and houses 
provide with gas.10  
 
We compile the performance indicator from the various indices giving equal weight to 
each of them.11 This weighing up of the variables is quite straightforward and 
economically intuitive (even though it is still somewhat ad hoc). It avoids the problem 
of lack of economic justification of a more complex statistical approach such as 
principal component analysis that might come to mind in this context. 
 
For those indicators where higher numbers are less favourable (e.g., irregularity in 
water provision, frequency of the accidental long interruptions of the electricity provision), 
we use the inverse of the original values. In order to facilitate the compilation, we 
normalised the values and set the average for all indices equal to unity (following the 
methodology adopted by Afonso et al. (2003)). The values for each region are then 
recalculated relative to the average. Table 1 presents the results for the constructed 








                                                          
10 The data and the respective sources are provide in the Annex. 




Table 3. Total regional performance indicator (TRPI), 2001 




































Abruzzo 0.43 1.04 0.90 1.09 0.62 0.92 1.14 0.88 
Basilicata 0.33 0.94 0.62 1.24 0.43 0.65 0.84 0.72 
Calabria 0.18 0.66 0.37 1.09 0.89 0.90 0.39 0.64 
Campania 0.49 0.86 0.61 1.29 1.43 1.01 0.92 0.94 
Emilia - Romagna 1.59 1.14 1.39 0.72 0.93 0.66 1.48 1.13 
Friuli - Venezia Giulia 4.22 0.92 1.72 0.82 0.85 0.61 1.30 1.49 
Lazio 0.67 1.00 0.73 1.45 1.60 0.77 1.41 1.09 
Liguria 1.77 1.01 1.23 1.48 2.83 0.69 1.24 1.46 
Lombardia 1.20 0.98 1.66 1.22 1.56 0.92 1.58 1.30 
Marche 0.96 0.97 1.23 0.78 0.41 1.69 1.22 1.04 
Molise 0.44 0.90 0.75 1.27 0.39 0.16 1.03 0.71 
Piemonte 1.25 0.95 1.14 0.98 1.40 3.13 1.35 1.46 
Puglia 0.31 0.89 0.83 0.86 1.07 3.51 0.97 1.21 
Sardegna 0.22 1.02 0.41 0.96 0.70 0.45 0.02 0.54 
Sicilia 0.24 0.75 0.52 0.80 0.40 1.13 0.49 0.62 
Toscana 0.82 1.28 0.91 0.78 1.04 0.63 1.39 0.98 
Trentino - Alto Adige 2.09 1.04 0.86 1.07 0.76 0.24 0.57 0.95 
Umbria 0.73 1.27 1.34 0.75 0.77 0.25 1.24 0.91 
Valle D'Aosta 1.00 1.23 1.68 0.52  0.07 0.19 0.78 
Veneto 1.05 1.15 1.11 0.82 0.92 1.60 1.23 1.13 






































1/ Each sub-indicator contributes 1/7 to total indicator. 
Note: Abruzzo – ABR; Basilicata – BAS; Calabria – CAL; Campania – CAM; Emilia - Romagna – 
ER; Friuli - Venezia Giulia – FVG; Lazio – LAZ; Liguria – LIG; Lombardia – LOM; Marche – MAR; 
Molise – MOL; Piemonte – PIE; Puglia – PUG; Sardegna – SAR; Sicilia – SIC; Toscana – TOS; 
Trentino - Alto Adige – TAA; Umbria – UMB; Valle D'Aosta – VDA; Veneto – VEN. 
 
The computed sub-indicators suggest large differences in public services provision 
performance across regions. Regions with the highest values for sub-indicators 
include Friuli - Venezia Giulia (water provision, and electricity provision), Toscana 
(waste collection), Liguria (public transports and railway utilisation), Puglia 
(motorway network), and Lombardia (gas provision). Regions such as Friuli - Venezia 
Giulia, Liguria, Piemonte, Lombardia, Puglia, Emilia-Romagna, and Veneto report 
high TRPI indicators.  
 
The derived TRPI will be used ahead in the next sub-section as our chosen output 
measure for the DEA analysis. 
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4.2 – DEA inputs 
 
We use two input measures: a financial measure, X1, which is the overall per capita 
spending in the region, and a quantitative measure, X2, the number of civil servants 
employed in each region defined as follows (data and sources are again reported in the 
Annex): 
 
X1 - total spending in the region/inhabitants in the region; 
X2 - civil servants per 1000 inhabitants = (civil servants/inhabitants)*1000. 
 
We first use a one input (regional spending per capita) and one output (TRPI) model. 
Afterwards we expand the analysis to a two-input (regional spending and civil 
servants) and one output (TRPI) model. Since the number of DMUs is not that large, 
one has to be careful in not using too many inputs or outputs, which would then 
increase the number of efficient by default DMUs.12 
 
4.3 – DEA analysis and results 
 
The general relationship for the theoretical production possibility frontier that we 
expect to test, regarding efficiency in regional provision on public services, can be 
given by the following function for region i: 
 
 )2,1( iii XXfY = , i=1,…,n  (2) 
 
where Yi is the TRPI, and X1i and X2i are the previously defined two inputs for each 
region. 
 
In Table 4 we report the DEA analysis results obtained with the one input, X1, and 
one output, TRPI, for the 20 Italian regions, both in terms of input and output oriented 
efficiency scores for 2001. 
 
 
                                                          
12 With less than three DMUs per input and output there is the risk that too many DMUs will turn 
out to be efficient. 
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Table 4. DEA results for Italian regions, 2001, 
1 input (expenditure) and 1 output (TRPI) 
 
Input oriented Output oriented Region 




Abruzzo 0.879 6 0.605 14 
Emilia – Romagna/ 
Piemonte, Emilia – Romagna 0.604 
Basilicata 0.482 12 0.488 16 
Emilia – Romagna/ 
Friuli - Venezia Giulia, Piemonte 0.272 
Calabria 0.462 14 0.433 18 
Emilia – Romagna/ 
Friuli - Venezia Giulia, Piemonte 0.232 
Campania 0.330 18 0.633 12 Emilia – Romagna/Friuli - Venezia Giulia 0.244 
Emilia - Romagna 1.000 1 1.000 1 Emilia – Romagna/Emilia – Romagna 0.883 
Friuli - Venezia Giulia 1.000 1 1.000 1 
Friuli - Venezia Giulia/ 
Friuli - Venezia Giulia 0.423 
Lazio 0.462 15 0.738 8 
Emilia – Romagna/ 
Friuli - Venezia Giulia, Piemonte 0.394 
Liguria 0.588 11 0.984 4 
Friuli - Venezia Giulia, Piemonte/ 
Friuli - Venezia Giulia, Piemonte 0.436 
Lombardia 0.882 5 0.893 6 
Emilia – Romagna, Piemonte/ 
Friuli - Venezia Giulia, Piemonte 0.837 
Marche 0.688 8 0.710 9 
Emilia – Romagna/ 
Friuli - Venezia Giulia, Piemonte 0.559 
Molise 0.360 16 0.474 17 Emilia – Romagna/Friuli - Venezia Giulia 0.199 
Piemonte 1.000 1 1.000 1 Piemonte/Piemonte 1.000 
Puglia 0.825 7 0.828 7 
Emilia – Romagna, Piemonte/ 
Friuli - Venezia Giulia, Piemonte 0.754 
Sardegna 0.350 17 0.363 20 Emilia – Romagna/Friuli - Venezia Giulia 0.148 
Sicilia 0.465 13 0.417 19 
Emilia – Romagna/ 
Friuli - Venezia Giulia, Piemonte 0.225 
Toscana 0.673 9 0.668 10 
Emilia – Romagna/ 
Friuli - Venezia Giulia, Piemonte 0.515 
Trentino - Alto Adige 0.080 19 0.634 11 Emilia – Romagna/Friuli - Venezia Giulia 0.059 
Umbria 0.600 10 0.618 13 
Emilia – Romagna/ 
Friuli - Venezia Giulia, Piemonte 0.426 
Valle D'Aosta 0.064 20 0.524 15 Emilia – Romagna/Friuli - Venezia Giulia 0.039 
Veneto 0.966 4 0.930 5 Emilia – Romagna/Emilia – Romagna 0.852 
Average 0.608  0.697   0.455 
 
 Notes: CRS TE - constant returns to scale technical efficiency. 
            VRS TE - variable returns to scale technical efficiency. 
 
From the results it is possible to see that three regions would labelled as most efficient 
and located on the theoretical production frontier: Emilia – Romagna, Friuli – Venezia 
Giulia, and Piemonte. Interestingly, these are all regions from the north of Italy, as is 
also the case of the regions ranked fourth and fifth, respectively Veneto and 
Lombardia. One should also mention that there is no DMU that is efficient by default, 
in other words all DMUs on the frontier are at least once a peer of a non-efficient 
region.  
 
According to the average efficiency scores, there seems to scope for an improvement 
of around 39 per cent and 30 per cent respectively in terms of input efficiency and of 
output efficiency.  
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In a different specification, we added the number of civil servants per 1000 
inhabitants as a second input in other words we include X2 in the production function 
(2). Table 5 reports this new set of results. 
 
Table 5. DEA results for Italian regions, 2001, 
2 inputs (expenditure, civil servants) and 1 output (TRPI) 
 
Input oriented Output oriented Region 




Abruzzo 0.942 8 0.605 14 
Puglia, Veneto/ 
Piemonte, Emilia – Romagna 0.604 
Basilicata 0.884 9 0.538 15 Puglia/Piemonte, Puglia 0.528 
Calabria 0.770 14 0.439 18 Puglia/ Friuli - Venezia Giulia, Piemonte 0.409 
Campania 0.870 11 0.696 10 Puglia/ Piemonte, Puglia 0.681 
Emilia - Romagna 1.000 1 1.000 1 Emilia - Romagna/Emilia – Romagna 0.883 
Friuli - Venezia Giulia 1.000 1 1.000 1 
Friuli - Venezia Giulia/ 
Friuli - Venezia Giulia 0.705 
Lazio 0.884 10 0.815 8 Puglia/ Piemonte, Puglia 0.800 
Liguria 0.954 7 0.997 6 
Friuli - Venezia Giulia, Piemonte/ 
Friuli - Venezia Giulia, Piemonte 0.844 
Lombardia 0.978 6 0.965 7 
Puglia, Piemonte, Veneto/ 
Piemonte, Puglia 0.963 
Marche 0.808 12 0.710 9 
Puglia, Piemonte/ 
Friuli - Venezia Giulia, Piemonte 0.651 
Molise 0.735 16 0.483 17 Puglia/ Friuli - Venezia Giulia, Piemonte 0.431 
Piemonte 1.000 1 1.000 1 Piemonte/Piemonte 1.000 
Puglia 1.000 1 1.000 1 Puglia/Puglia 1.000 
Sardegna 0.644 18 0.366 20 Puglia/ Friuli - Venezia Giulia, Piemonte 0.289 
Sicilia 0.750 15 0.422 19 Puglia/Friuli - Venezia Giulia, Piemonte 0.383 
Toscana 0.801 13 0.669 11 
Puglia, Veneto/ 
Friuli - Venezia Giulia, Piemonte 0.616 
Trentino - Alto Adige 0.253 19 0.634 12 Puglia/ Friuli - Venezia Giulia 0.198 
Umbria 0.715 17 0.618 13 
Puglia, Veneto/ 
Friuli - Venezia Giulia, Piemonte 0.510 
Valle D'Aosta 0.215 20 0.524 16 Puglia/ Friuli - Venezia Giulia 0.139 
Veneto 1.000 1 1.000 1 Veneto/Veneto 0.852 
Average 0.810  0.724   0.624 
 
 Notes: CRS TE - constant returns to scale technical efficiency. 
            VRS TE - variable returns to scale technical efficiency. 
 
From this new set of results now five regions are seen as most efficient: Emilia – 
Romagna, Friuli – Venezia Giulia, and Piemonte, as before, plus Puglia and Veneto. 
In addition, Veneto is now efficient by default in the output oriented DEA analysis. 
Moreover, with this alternative specification using two inputs, on average the same 
level of outputs might be obtained with 19 per cent less resources. On the other hand, 




Figure 5 provides an alternative presentation of the ranking of the regions’ efficiency 
scores from Table 5 for the input oriented analysis. Again, all the efficient regions are 
located in the north of Italy, the exception being Puglia. This last region, already well 
ranked in the one input analysis (seventh place) is now labelled efficient because it 
has the lowest ratio of civil servants per 1000 inhabitants in the sample. 
 
Figure 5 – Ranking of efficiency scores for the Italian regions, 2001 







Notice however, that it is not easy to accurately identify the effects of regional 
spending on public services outcomes and separate the impact of spending from other 
influences. For instance, it is difficult to assess to what extent does irregularity in 
water provision and electricity service failures reflect public intervention rather than 
other factors such as climate, and geographical conditions. On that line of reasoning, 




5 – Conclusion 
  
In this paper, we have evaluated efficiency in providing public services across Italian 
regions by assessing a so-called TRPI index, our output measure, against the inputs 
used: regional per capita spending and the number of regional civil servants per 1000 
inhabitants. With data for 2001, we constructed the performance index as a composite 
index of seven sub-indicators of regional public performance: water provision, waste 
collection, frequency of  the accidental long interruptions of the electrical  service, 
public transportation utilization, railway utilization, motorway network, and houses 
provide with gas.  
 
Input and output efficiency scores were then estimated by solving a standard DEA 
problem with the 20 Italian regions as DMUs. The results that inefficiencies may be 
significant and some improvements may be possible across regions. On average, and 
using the results from the one output and two input analysis, regions could have 
increased their output by 28 percent using the same resources (as can be seen from the 
average output score from Table 5), with a region like Sardegna having a theoretical 
margin for potential output improvement of 63 percent. On the other hand, on 
average, regions could have decreased their inputs by 19 percent and still obtain the 
same output, with a region like Valle D'Aosta displaying scope for a potential 
improvement of 78 percent. 
 
To our knowledge, this is the first attempt at computing a performance composite 
indicator for public services provision at the Italian regional level. This same is true 
for the subsequent non-parametric efficiency analysis. However, all these first results 
have to be seen as indicative and need to be interpreted with great care. Indeed, and 
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for instance, it would be useful to use only the number of civil servants that are more 
directly involved in the provision of regional public services. This additional analysis 





Table A1 – Main interventions that occurred in some public utilities sectors: 
water and waste 
 






































Law 36/94, (so called Galli Law) has 
aimed to introduce competition within 
water service sector in order to ensure 
efficiency in production and management 















EU Directive 91/156/CE 
EU Directive 91/689/CE 
EU Directive 94/62/CE 
Legislative Decree 22/1997 (so called 
Ronchi Decree) 
Legislative Decree 389/1998  
Law 426/1998  
Law 326/2004 
The Law has established new local water authorities 
Autorità d’ambito Territoriale Ottimale (ATOs) and a 
separation between water resource planning and the 
operation of water utilities.  
ATOs, whose borders are set by the Italian Regions, have 
the task of  
-defining the resource planning;  
-assigning the operation to a private provider, selected 
through auction; 
-setting the price (tariff) cap for the water utilities 
(including aqueduct systems, sewage systems and 
treatment plants); 
-drawing up the Piano d’Ambito (a 30 year plan) which 
includes the timing and level of infrastructure investments, 





This group of legislative interventions covers collection, 
treatment and disposal of waste. It has introduced through 
several steps an increasing process of decentralisation of 
competences from the State to the Regions and the others 
local entities.  
The regulatory governance is based on the definition of the 
integrated management of waste through regional and 
provincial plans.  
The ATOs have the task to ensure the operation and the 
management of the waste according to the plans and in 
collaboration with the Regions, Provinces and 
Municipalities 
The law has introduced the tariff mechanism to cover the 
operational costs, which should have replaced the TaRSU, 
a specific tax on waste, but by law the transition period 
was prorogated from  Jannuary 1999 to jannuary 2005.  
 








Table A2 – Main interventions that occurred in some public utilities sectors: 
energy sector 
 
Industry Regulatory Framework 
 
Regulatory Governance 










































Law 481/95 established the Authority for 






EU Directive 96/92/CE 
Legislative Decree (so called Bersani 
Decree) 79/1999 liberalised the sector, 
promoting competition into generation and 
























EU Directive 98/30/CE 
Delegated legislative Decreee 625/96 
eliminated the legal monopoly of ENI, the 
public monopolist 
Delegate Legislative Decree 164/2000 (so 




There is an Independent National Authority called 
Authority for Electricity and Gas (AEEG), created in 
1997. It has regulatory powers such as the determination 
of i) pricing ; ii) quality level of services i, iii) economical 
and technical conditions of the network access and 
interconnession.  
 
The production, import/export and distribution are 
liberalised  
The transmission network is still public and managed by 
the State through the Trasmission System Operator 
(Gestore della Rete di Trasmissione), which has a 
concession contract, with the owner Terma Spa, a 
company of the Enel Group, the former monopolist public 
provider, transformed in a joint-stock company in 1999. 
The Operator is obliged to connect to the network all the 
requiring providers, which have to pay a fee determinated 
by the AEEG. The market is divided in two: one part is 
captive and the other free. In the first case the providers 
pay a fee determinated by the AEEG and in the second a 
price determinated by the market. 
In addition, the reform allows for only one concession for 
distribution on the territory of each municipality 
The Operator has created the so called Single Buyer 
(Acquirente Unico) and the Electric Market Manager 
(Gestore Mercato elettrico). The former is encharged to 
sell the energy to those providers operating in the captive 
market. The tariffs are in this case regulated by AEEG.The 
latter has the task to regulate the generation market, 
ensuring the matching between demand and supply in 
acompetitive framework. In this case the price is 
determinated within the market. 
The principle of uniform tariff is now applied only for 
captive consumers. 
 
Starting from 2003 small customers and  household are 
free to choose the providers, which cannot exceed a 
ceiling of 75% of total imports and production (decreasing 
by 2% a year, down to a 61% ceiling in 2010) nor to 
exceed a ceiling of 50% of the sales to final consumers. 
Both ceilings will be removed in 2010. The AEEG has the 
task to regulate Third Party Access to the storage, 
transmission and distribution networks. It fixes the tariffs 
for transmission, distribution and the captive customers 
(Decision 138/03). on the basis of price caps. Concessions 
for distribution are managed by the Municipalities through 
auctions 
 
Source: Elaboration on OECD (2001) and Confservizi (2004). 
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EU Directive 95/18/CE 
EU Directive 95/19/CE 
President of the Republic Decree-Dpr 
277/1998, introduced the access to 
international operators and the accounting 
separation 
President of the Republic Decree-Dpr 
146/1999 implemented the criteria for 











CIPE Decision n.319/1996 
IT Directive 1998 (so called Ciampi-Costa 
Directive)  
Legislative Decree 400/1999 
Law 448/2001 
Law 326/2004 
In 1992 Ferrovie dello Stato, the former monopolist 
became a joint stock company, still owned by the Ministry 
of Treasury. 
The legal separation between the network operator (RTF) 
and the service company (Trenitalia) took place in 2000, 
after the inroduction of the accounting separation in 1999. 
The State responsabilities for local railways have been 
decentralised to the regions. Competition for local should 
have been introduced in 2003, but the Budget Law of 2004 
has prorogated the transition period, for the local public 
services  
The international freeight segment has been liberlised 
during 2000 (licens has been granted. All other segments 
have been liberalised with the Budget Law of 2000 and 4 
licences already issued for the international segment have 
been extended. In October 2000 the network operator has 
adopted a Network code for non-discriminatory access 
 
 
The road network is still public and managed by the State 
through the ANAS, which has a concession contract, with 
the different companies and the former main operator 
Società Autostrade transformed in a joint-stock company 
and privatised. 
ANAS has to define the parameters, which each company 
needs in order to determinate the price cup and 
consequently the tariff or toll. 
 
The Legislative Decree 400/1999 has  
-given a new definition of subsidy transfer mechanisms for 
minimum services by the Regional Governments;  
-introduced the adoption of service contracts to regulate 
the relationship between the granting Authority and the 
service provider;  
-affirmed the compulsory public tenders for the 
assignment of services by the end of 2003;  
Additionally all the special companies and consortia 
should have been transformed into joint stock companies 
or cooperatives (within 31st December 2000); 
Eeach Regional Government had to established a regional 
fund for transport replacing the old national transportation 
fund.  
The Budget Law of 2004 has prorogated the transition 
period, for the local public services and pushed towards 
the adpotion of the “in house” provision, stopping the 
liberation process, which was confirmed in the Budget 
Law of 2001 
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Annex - Data and Sources 
 
Table 1 - Original data set for the TRPI (2001) 
 
Public services users over 
total users, moving for 













































Abruzzo 21.8 540.9 3.37 26.7 2.6 7422 385 
Basilicata 28.2 485.3 4.91 30.5 1.8 4855 122 
Calabria 51.1 343.1 8.19 26.7 3.7 10147 224 
Campania 19.4 448.5 4.92 31.6 5.9 10239 1031 
Emilia - Romagna 5.9 589.3 2.18 17.6 3.8 10945 1489 
Friuli - Venezia Giulia 2.2 479.3 1.76 20.1 3.5 3593 401 
Lazio 13.9 520.3 4.14 35.7 6.6 9958 1754 
Liguria 5.3 523.8 2.46 36.2 11.7 4067 628 
Lombardia 7.9 507.9 1.82 29.9 6.5 11860 3346 
Marche 9.7 505.0 2.46 19.0 1.7 6831 422 
Molise 21.1 468.9 4.02 31.2 1.6 2839 91 
Piemonte 7.5 491.8 2.66 24.0 5.8 22636 1534 
Puglia 30.1 462.7 3.62 21.2 4.4 11630 913 
Sardegna 42.9 526.5 7.37 23.6 2.9 8543 10 
Sicilia 39.6 387.3 5.80 19.5 1.7 16339 636 
Toscana 11.5 664.0 3.30 19.1 4.3 11299 1186 
Trentino - Alto Adige 4.5 537.4 3.50 26.2 3.1 4554 143 
Umbria 12.9 657.3 2.26 18.3 3.2 4287 235 
Valle D'Aosta 9.4 637.4 1.80 12.7  762 10 
Veneto 8.9 595.6 2.73 20.2 3.8 10097 1273 
Average 17.7 518.6 3.66 24.5 3.9 8645 792 
Minimum 2.2 343.1 1.8 12.7 1.6 762.0 10.0 
Maximum 51.1 664.0 8.2 36.2 11.7 22636.2 3346.0 
 
1/ Source: Istat, I servizi pubblici e di pubblica utilità: utilizzo e soddisfazione. Indagine Multiscopo 
sulle famiglie, “Aspetti della vita quotidiana”, 2001. 
2/ Source: Istat - Statistical Yearbook, 2001-2002. 
3/ Frequency of the accidental long interruptions of the  electrical  service (average number for 
customer). Source: Istat and MEF-DPS on data provide by the Autorità per l'energia elettrica e il gas. 
Indicatori di contesto, 2003. 
4/ Regional data are calculated on the indication of DPCM from 21/09/2001, which identifies the 
















































Abruzzo 1281283 18635 10763 174.9 137 14,5 
Basilicata 604807 7775 9995 150.5 249 12,9 
Calabria 2043288 30150 15081 530.6 260 14,8 
Campania 5782244 75774 13590 2103.1 364 13,1 
Emilia - Romagna 4008663 60831 22117 480.9 120 15,2 
Friuli - Venezia Giulia 1188594 23755 7858 393.9 331 20,0 
Lazio 5302302 68439 17236 1377.8 260 12,9 
Liguria 1621016 26559 5422 511.2 315 16,4 
Lombardia 9121714 118209 23863 1332.3 146 13,0 
Marche 1469195 22550 9694 256.3 174 15,3 
Molise 327177 5073 4438 108.9 333 15,5 
Piemonte 4289731 60975 25402 586.3 137 14,2 
Puglia 4086608 46537 19358 614.0 150 11,4 
Sardegna 1648044 29091 24090 565.2 343 17,7 
Sicilia 5076700 77039 25711 1308.5 258 15,2 
Toscana 3547604 54010 22994 632.1 178 15,2 
Trentino - Alto Adige 943123 42508 13607 1411.3 1496 45,1 
Umbria 840482 14300 8456 168.0 200 17,0 
Valle D'Aosta 120589 6395 3263 226.0 1874 53,0 
Veneto 4540853 64182 18399 564.2 124 14,1 
Total 57844017 852785 301336 13496.0   





























Note: Campania – CAM; Emilia - Romagna – ER; Lombardia – LOM; Molise – MOL; Puglia – PUG; 
Sicilia – SIC; Valle D'Aosta – VDA. 
 
1/ Source: Istat, Statistical Yearbook 2002. 
2/ Source: Statistiche delle Amministrazioni Pubbliche-ISTAT, 2002. 
3/ Source: MEF-DPS, Banca Dati Conti Pubblici Terrritoriali, specific data compilation for the present 
work, http://www.dps.tesoro.it/cpt/banca_dati_home.asp. 
 
 
